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Highlights of the NIOSH Health Hazard Evaluation 
 
NIOSH Evaluation of Air Sampling Methodologies for Bacillus anthracis in a United States 
Postal Service Processing and Distribution Center 
 
 
On January 16, 2002, NIOSH received a request for a health hazard evaluation (HHE) from the United 
States Postal Service (USPS) regarding Bacillus anthracis in the Trenton Processing and Distribution 
Center (TPDC) located in Trenton, New Jersey. The USPS requested assistance in determining the most 
appropriate method(s) of air sampling for B. anthracis spores. In response to this request, NIOSH 
investigators conducted an environmental investigation at the site on February 4-7, 2002.  
What NIOSH Did 
# We took surface wipe samples on a Delivery 
Bar Code Sorter (DBCS) before and after 
turning it on. 
# We took air samples using mixed-cellulose, 
polytetrafluoroethylene, and gelatin filters; 
Andersen samplers with sheep blood agar; 
and dry filter units with polyester felt filters. 
# We took air samples around the DBCS 
before, during, and after turning it on. 
# We tested the filter samples two ways. First, 
the samples were tested as normal (not all 
the sample is used). Second, any negative 
results (no B. anthracis) had the remaining 
sample tested to make sure the sample was 
negative. 
What NIOSH Found 
# All of the wipe samples were positive, 
indicating the DBCS was heavily 
contaminated with B. anthracis. 
# Some of the Andersen samples collected 
before operating the DBCS were positive, 
while most of the samples collected after 
DBCS operation were positive. 
# The first test of the filter samples collected 
before operating the DBCS resulted in no 
positive samples. 
 
What NIOSH Found (Cont’d) 
# The first test of the filter samples collected 
after operating the DBCS found more positive 
samples. 
# Testing of the remaining sample of the 
negative filters from before and after 
operating the DBCS indicated that all filter 
types had more positive samples. 
# The results suggest that the entire filter 
sample should be used to analyze for B. 
anthracis. 
# The results suggest that the dry filter units 
and their high flow rate could have influenced 
the way the other samplers collected 
B. anthracis. 
# B. anthracis can become airborne by walking 
or lightly working in a contaminated area. 
What NIOSH Recommends 
# The Andersen sampler should be one of 
the instruments utilized when screening, 
characterizing, and/or clearing a B. anthracis 
contaminated facility for re-occupancy. 
# When taking air samples for B. anthracis 
using filter media, the entire sample extract 
must be tested. 
# More information is needed on how well 
these and other methods work when sampling 
for B. anthracis. 
 
 
What To Do For More Information: 
We encourage you to read the full report. If you 
would like a copy, either ask your health and safety 
representative to make you a copy or call 
1-513-841-4252 and ask for 
 HETA Report #2002-0109-2927  
 iv 
Health Hazard Evaluation Report 2002-0109-2927 
Trenton Processing and Distribution Center 
Trenton, New Jersey 
February 2004 
 
Robert E. McCleery, MSPH 
Kenneth F. Martinez, MSEE, CIH 
Gregory A. Burr, CIH 




On January 16, 2002, NIOSH received a request for a health hazard evaluation (HHE) from the United 
States Postal Service (USPS) regarding Bacillus anthracis (B. anthracis) contamination in the Trenton 
Processing and Distribution Center (TPDC) located in Trenton, New Jersey. The USPS requested 
assistance in determining the most appropriate method(s) of air sampling for B. anthracis spores. 
 
In response to this request, NIOSH investigators conducted an evaluation of sampling methods at the 
TPDC on February 4-7, 2002. NIOSH investigators collected 106 surface wipe samples on the 
jogger/sorter, feeder, reader, and all final stacker (bin) sections of a Delivery Bar Code Sorter (DBCS), 
130 general area (GA) air samples using Andersen samplers with sheep blood agar, 24 GA air samples 
using mixed-cellulose ester filter media, 24 GA air samples using polytetrafluoroethylene filter media, 
72 GA air samples using gelatin filter media, and 6 GA air samples using a dry filter unit with polyester 
felt filter media. 
 
Wipe and air samples were collected before and after operating the DBCS. Operating the DBCS provided 
a means of re-aerosolization of spores resulting in enhanced capture potential for air sampling media. All 
of the wipe samples were positive for B. anthracis. The initial analysis of air samples (using 10% of the 
sample extract) collected before DBCS operation resulted in no detectable B. anthracis colonies (negative 
sample), except for some Andersen samples. All of the negative filter samples were re-analyzed using the 
remaining sample, which resulted in each type of filter media having one or more false negative samples. 
All air sample media had detectable B. anthracis colonies subsequent to DBCS operation. 
 
 
Based on the surface wipe and air sample data, NIOSH investigators conclude the 
following:  (1) walking and light work may be sufficient to re-aerosolize B. anthracis 
spores; (2) all air sampling methods used were capable of collecting B. anthracis spores, 
albeit some more efficiently than others; (3) not plating the entire sample during analysis 
may result in false negative sample results; (4) the Andersen sampling method seems to 
be the most sensitive for B. anthracis spore collection; (5) because of its high flow rate 
the dry filter unit may have reduced the number of available spores for collection; (6) the 
dry filter unit may be the least sensitive when considering the volume of air passing 
through the sampler. Further laboratory and field evaluation of these and other methods is 
necessary to understand their practical uses and limitations for collection of B. anthracis 
in contaminated facilities.  
 
Keywords:  SIC 4311 (United States Postal Service), Bacillus anthracis, B. anthracis, anthrax, air sample, 
wipe sample, filter cassette, mixed cellulose ester, MCE, polytetrafluoroethylene, PTFE, gelatin, GEL, 
Andersen sampler, dry filter unit, DFU 
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On January 16, 2002, the National Institute for 
Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) 
received a request for a health hazard 
evaluation (HHE) from the United States Postal 
Service (USPS) regarding Bacillus anthracis 
(B. anthracis) contamination in the Trenton 
Processing and Distribution Center (TPDC) 
located near Trenton, New Jersey. The USPS 
requested assistance in determining the most 
appropriate method(s) for air sampling for 
B. anthracis spores. In response to this request, a 
collaborative research project between NIOSH 
and the USPS was conducted during the week of 
February 4-7, 2002. 
 
The site visit began with an opening conference 
on February 4, 2002, with representatives from 
NIOSH, USPS, Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), New Jersey Department of 
Health and Senior Services (NJDHSS), The 
Shaw Group Incorporated™ (formally the IT 
Group), and URS Corporation personnel (USPS 
contractors). Discussion topics included the 
sampling objectives, the sampling protocol for 
composite surface wipe sampling and air 
sampling, the previous decontamination efforts, 
the needs and concerns of the various groups 
involved with on-going efforts in and around the 
site, and the safety requirements of the site. 
Environmental sampling began on the afternoon 
of February 4 and continued until the afternoon 




The roughly 300,000 square foot (ft2) TPDC is a 
facility that employs approximately 850 people. 
At least four letters containing B. anthracis 
were processed through this facility: two on 
September 18, 2001, intended for New York 
City media outlets, and two on October 9, 2001, 
to U.S. Senators in Washington, D.C.1 The 
facility was closed on October 18, 2001, after 
cutaneous anthrax was confirmed in a TPDC 
postal worker. Seven anthrax cases (three 
confirmed cutaneous, two suspect cutaneous, 
and two confirmed inhalational) were eventually 
identified. Five cases were associated with 
TPDC, one with a downstream post office, and 
one with a private business. On October 25, 
2001, all TPDC employees were offered the 60-
day post-exposure prophylaxis.2,3 
 
After the initial cutaneous anthrax case was 
confirmed, the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
conducted the first directed environmental 
anthrax sampling at TPDC on October 18, 2001. 
Twenty-three wet swab samples were collected, 
which traced the mail paths of the four suspected 
letters; fourteen of these samples were positive 
for B. anthracis. Subsequently, a joint Centers 
for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC)/ 
NJDHSS team collected an additional 95 wet 
swab and surface vacuum samples on 
October 21, 2001, and November 11, 2001, to 
characterize the extent of B. anthracis 
contamination throughout the mail processing 
areas. Of these 95 samples, 40 were positive, 
including several from the TPDC air handling 
systems, which suggested that the contamination 
was not limited to specific sorting machines or 
work areas. Since November 2001, hundreds of 
additional wet swabs, wipes, and surface 
vacuum samples have been collected by the 
USPS as part of their clean-up effort. 
 
CONDUCT OF FIELD 
STUDY 
Site Selection 
For this evaluation of various air sampling 
methods, investigators selected Delivery Bar 
Code Sorter #70 (DBCS) for study since it was 
in the direct mail path for several of the 
contaminated letters. A DBCS is divided into the 
following sections: jogger/sorter, feeder, reader, 
and stackers (bins). The unit had been spot-
cleaned in November 2001 using a four-step 
process: (1) high-efficiency particulate air 
vacuuming; (2) application of a 10% bleach 
solution with a contact time of 10 minutes; (3) 
application of a neutralizing solution (sodium 
thiosulfate); and (4) final rinse with clean water. 
Following cleaning, the machine was loosely 
covered in plastic. For the purpose of our study, 
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in January 2002 a plastic-walled enclosure 
(approximately 70' x 15' x 7') was constructed 
around the machine. Prior to sampling in the 
enclosure, the loose plastic covering over the 
machine was cleaned and removed. The 
enclosure was constructed to improve the 
chances of collecting B. anthracis spores and to 
avoid contaminating surrounding equipment. 
Sample Collection 
CDC/NIOSH investigators collected air and 
surface wipe samples for B. anthracis spores 
before and after operating the DBCS. (Note:  
when referring to air sampling, the phrase “after 
DBCS operation” means during and after DBCS 
operation.) Wipe samples were collected to 
gain insight into whether the DBCS was 
contaminated and the degree of contamination in 
the following areas:  the jogger/sorter, feeder, 
reader, and all final stacker (bin) sections of the 
DBCS. In the bin area, most wipe samples were 
collected from a column of four bins (referred 
to as composite wipe samples). There were two 
exceptions where a column consisted of three 
bins and a printer. 
 
Figure 1 presents the locations where mixed-
cellulose ester (MCE), polytetrafluoroethylene 
(PTFE), gelatin (GEL), dry filter unit (DFU) 
(developed by the Joint Program Office for 
Biological Defense [JPO-BD]), and Andersen 
air samples were collected. Locations were 
selected to encompass the area around each 
section of the DBCS and maximize the 
possibility of spore collection. The overall 
sample collection period lasted approximately 
8 hours each day, with additional sample 
collection during the first 2 hours of this 8-hour 
period. Investigators conducted this additional 
sampling for the following reasons: (1) to 
address the susceptibility of GEL filters to 
dessication, (2) to balance the air sample 
volumes for comparison of the methods, (3) to 
investigate whether 2- and 8-hour sampling 
periods result in positive samples, and (4) to 
mirror air-sampling periods used in prior 
anthrax investigations. MCE and PTFE filter 
samples were collected for 2- and 8-hour 
sessions. GEL filter samples were collected for 
1-hour each during the initial 2-hour session and 
then over 2-hour intervals each during the 8-
hour session. During the first two hours, 
Andersen samples were collected in succession 
approximately every ten minutes. One 10-
minute sample was then collected every two 
hours over the remaining 6-hour period. DFU 
filter samples were collected for both the 2- and 
8- hour sessions. 
 
On February 6, a USPS employee entered into 
the building with the CDC/NIOSH team to 
energize and operate the DBCS. At issue was 
whether operation of the DBCS would 
aerosolize B. anthracis spores. The employee 
started the DBCS and its computer program, 
configured it to operational status, and set the 
parameters of the computer program to deposit 
the “test deck” sheets to specific bins. The 
program was then run and the test deck began 
distributing through the system. The employee 
gathered the sheets, set the computer program to 
release the sheets at another set of bins, and ran 
the sheets through again. At times, the DBCS 
jammed which required the employee to re-set 
the computer program and re-initiate the test 
run. In total, the machine was operated for 
45 minutes. The DBCS computer program 
indicated that 6,521 “test deck” sheets had 
passed through the system during that time 
period. 
Sampling Methods 
Surface Wipe Sampling 
Composite wipe samples were collected 
according to CDC guidelines.4 The procedure 
included the use of 4” x 4” sterile polyester/ 
rayon pads moistened with sterile water, 
placement of samples in sterile conical vials, a 
change of gloves after each sample collection, 
decontamination of sample containers with 




Air samples for B. anthracis were collected 
using trypticase soy agar (TSA) with five 
percent sheep blood (referred to as sheep 
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blood agar [SBA]) in Andersen single-stage 
cascade impactors at a calibrated sampling rate 
of 28.3 liters per minute (lpm). The Andersen 
single-stage cascade impactor has a calculated 
d50 of 0.57 micrometer (µm) (the d50 of an 
impactor is the diameter at which theoretically 
50% of the particles are collected and 50% of 
the particles pass through).5 Agar plates were 
loaded into the Andersen sampler outside the 
containment area at an approximate height of 
three feet using aseptic techniques (e.g., the 
cleaning and sanitization of working surfaces, 
the wiping of Andersen sampler collection 
surfaces with alcohol between samples, and the 
inversion of sample plates before and after 
sampling). Samplers were then moved inside the 
containment and placed in their predetermined 
location. At that time, the Andersen samplers 
which had operated for their 10-minute sampling 
period were moved outside of containment, their 
agar plates removed and covered, sealed with 
tape around the circumference, and placed into 
individual sealed bags. After sampling was 
complete, the individual sealed bags containing 
the samples went through the decontamination 
process, were packed into containers according 
to existing transportation regulations, and sent to 
the CDC contract laboratory. 
Mixed Cellulose Ester, 
Polytetrafluoroethylene, and Gelatin 
Filters 
Air samples for B. anthracis were collected 
using MCE, PTFE, and GEL filters in a closed-
faced cassette at a calibrated sampling rate of 
2.0 lpm. MCE and PTFE filters were 37-
millimeter (mm) diameter, 0.8-µm pore size, 
while GEL filters were 37-mm diameter, 3.0-µm 
pore size. After sampling was complete, each 
filter cassette was capped and placed into 
a plastic cup with a screw-on top. The cups were 
then placed into a large sealed bag for 
decontamination and shipping. 
Dry Filter Unit 
Air samples for B. anthracis were collected 
using a 47-mm diameter, 1.0 µm pore size 
polyester felt filter disk (American Felt and 
Filter Company, New Windsor, New York) at an 
approximate (no specific calibration device 
available) sampling rate of 400 lpm. Samples 
were collected using single filter DFUs, one of 
which was modified to potentially reduce the 
amount of by-pass air-flow around the filter 
(provided by URS personnel). After sampling 
was complete, filters were removed from the 
DFU and placed into a plastic conical vial with a 
screw-on top. These vials were then placed into 
a large sealed bag and were treated the same as 
the above agar plates from the decontamination 
process forward. 
Test Deck Sheets 
Test deck sheets are currently used by the USPS 
to test the operation of a DBCS or other mail 
sorting machinery. These sheets are shaped to 
resemble a typical envelope in dimension and 
are thicker than a normal sheet of paper. Ten 
sheets (not chosen in any particular order) of the 
“test deck” that went through the DBCS during 
the 45-minute operation time were sent to the 
CDC contract laboratory for analysis. 
Sample Analysis 
A CDC contract laboratory (provisionally 
approved Level B in the Laboratory Response 
Network) analyzed the samples by using a 
wet extraction for wipes and wet extraction with 
modifications for other sample collection 
matrices,6 and it presumptively identified B. 
anthracis (Level A screening) according to CDC 
protocol.7 The confirmation of presumptive 
positive samples was accomplished by Gamma 
Phage Lysis (GPL) and Direct Fluorescence 
Antibody (DFA) analyses. 
Statistical Strategy 
A statistical analysis of the Andersen sampling 
results was done to assess the effects of time and 
sampling location on B. anthracis concentration. 
Individual air sample concentrations from 
Andersen samplers were compiled into a 
STATGRAPHICS Plus® database. Histograms 
and the Shapiro-Wilks test for normality of 
the log-transformed data indicated that the data 
were approximately lognormally distributed. 
Thus, B. anthracis concentrations were log-
transformed for statistical analyses using 
multiple linear regression. Factors including 
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time, location, and their interaction term, were 
added to the model and eliminated using a 
backwards elimination process. Only factors 
with P-values less than 0.05 were kept in the 
final model. 
Theoretical Decay Curves 
Theoretical B. anthracis concentration decay 
curves were established for each type of sampler 
inside containment (i.e., DFU, Andersen, and 
other pumps). This information was used to 
investigate the operating sampler contribution to 
the decrease of airborne B. anthracis inside the 
containment. Specific interest was placed on 
the theoretical curve of the DFU due to its 
high flow rate (≈400 lpm). The sampler decay 
curves were combined to form one overall 
theoretical B. anthracis decay curve, which is 
presented with the actual Andersen sampler 
decay curve to investigate the consistency 
between theoretical and actual data.  The 
cureves were also subjectively evaluated to 
determine the extent to which the samplers 
potentially “filtered” the air of B. anthracis as 
well as affected the sampling collection potential 




As a guide to the evaluation of the hazards posed 
by workplace exposures, NIOSH field staff 
employ environmental evaluation criteria for 
the assessment of a number of chemical and 
physical agents. These criteria are intended to 
suggest levels of exposure to which most 
workers may be exposed up to 10 hours per day, 
40 hours per week for a working lifetime 
without experiencing adverse health effects. It 
is, however, important to note that not all 
workers will be protected from adverse 
health effects even though their exposures are 
maintained below these levels. A small 
percentage may experience adverse health 
effects because of individual susceptibility, a 
pre-existing medical condition, and/or a 
hypersensitivity (allergy). In addition, some 
hazardous substances may act in combination 
with other workplace exposures, the general 
environment, or with medications or personal 
habits of the worker to produce health effects 
even if the occupational exposures are controlled 
at the level set by the criterion. These combined 
effects are often not considered in the evaluation 
criteria. Also, some substances are absorbed by 
direct contact with the skin and mucous 
membranes, and thus potentially increases the 
overall exposure. Finally, evaluation criteria 
may change over the years as new information 
on the toxic effects of an agent become 
available. 
 
The primary sources of environmental 
evaluation criteria for the workplace are: (1) 
NIOSH Recommended Exposure Limits 
(RELs),8 (2) the American Conference of 
Governmental Industrial Hygienists’ (ACGIH®) 
Threshold Limit Values (TLVs®),9 and (3) the 
U.S. Department of Labor, OSHA Permissible 
Exposure Limits (PELs).10 Employers are 
encouraged to follow the OSHA limits, the 
NIOSH RELs, the ACGIH TLVs, or whichever 
are the more protective criterion. 
 
OSHA requires an employer to furnish 
employees a place of employment that is free 
from recognized hazards that are causing or 
are likely to cause death or serious physical 
harm [Occupational Safety and Health Act of 
1970, Public Law 91-596, sec. 5(a)(1)]. Thus, 
employers should understand that not all 
hazardous chemicals have specific OSHA 
exposure limits such as PELs and short-term 
exposure limits (STELs). An employer is still 
required by OSHA to protect their employees 
from hazards, even in the absence of a specific 
OSHA PEL. 
 
A time-weighted average (TWA) exposure 
refers to the average airborne concentration of 
a substance during a normal 8- to 10-hour 
workday. Some substances have recommended 
STEL or ceiling values which are intended to 
supplement the TWA where there are 
recognized toxic effects from higher exposures 
over the short-term. 
Bacillus anthracis 
B. anthracis is a rod-shaped, gram-positive, non-
motile, spore-forming bacterium which is 
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present globally. The sporulated form of 
B. anthracis is typically found in the soil and is 
known to inhabit environments for decades. The 
bacteria are known to produce a variety of 
toxins. Anthrax, also referred to as Woolsorter’s 
disease and Ragpicker’s disease, is the clinical 
term for the disease caused by B. anthracis. The 
word originates from the Greek word for coal, 
which probably refers to the skin appearance of 
the cutaneous form of the disease. Anthrax has 
an extensive human history and is referred to in 
the following: (1) Homer’s Iliad,11,12 (2) biblical 
passages describing the fifth Egyptian plague 
affecting livestock and the sixth plague called 
the “plague of boils”12,13 (although a study 
conducted by John Marr and Curtis Malloy 
presents a different explanation for the fifth and 
sixth biblical plagues14) and (3) Virgil’s The 
Georgics.12,15,16 Robert Koch showed that 
B. anthracis spores caused anthrax disease in 
mice17 and Lewis Pasteur developed an effective 
immunization against anthrax in animals.18  
Several countries have experimented with 
anthrax as a biological warfare agent. A large 
outbreak in Sverdlovsk, Russia, killed at least 
60 people and is thought to be the result of 
spores from a Soviet Army biological research 
facility upwind of the town.19 
 
Humans can naturally contract anthrax disease 
through exposure to infected livestock or wild 
animals, or contaminated animal products such 
as hides or hair. There are three clinical forms 
of anthrax: cutaneous (the most common), 
gastrointestinal, and inhalational. The cutaneous 
form begins when B. anthracis enters the skin 
through a cut or abrasion forming a black lesion. 
Once the bacterium enter the blood stream it 
can cause septicemia (blood poisoning) and 
ultimately death. The gastrointestinal form of 
anthrax is caused by the consumption of 
contaminated animal meat. Symptoms usually 
begin with nausea, vomiting, and fever which 
can progress to septicemia. Inhalational anthrax 
is the most deadly form. The number of spores 
needed to cause disease and the incubation 
period are both unknown. Symptoms may begin 
with a flu-like feeling and mild fever and 
progress to respiratory failure. Anthrax-related 
information, publications, and guidance for post-
exposure prophylaxis and treatment are available 
on the CDC website, http://www.cdc.gov/. 
There are currently no numeric criteria against 





The following information provides summary 
results for the composite wipe samples and each 
type of air sampling media used in this study. 
Results are described as positive (detectable 
colonies) or negative (no detectable colonies). 
Appendices A-G present the individual sample 
results before and after DBCS operation (in 
tabular form) for the composite wipe samples, 
each type of air sampling media (Andersen 
sampler, MCE, PTFE, GEL, DFU), and test kit 
sheet samples, respectively. 
 
In Appendices B-F, the air samples “after DBCS 
operation” were started at the same time the 
machine was started and ran for their allotted 
time periods. Table 1 presents the “test deck” 
information from the DBCS machine operation 
period. Table 2 presents the sample results from 
the initial sample analysis by individual sample 
location. Table 3 provides a summary of all the 
sample results before and after DBCS operation 
including initial analysis and analysis of the 
remaining sample results. 
 
The sample B. anthracis concentration of each 
initially positive filter, assuming a homogeneous 
mixture, was calculated by extrapolating from 
the plated portion of the sample concentrate. 
Filter media that were initially positive did not 
have the remaining sample analyzed to establish 
an overall B. anthracis colony concentration. 
Surface Wipe Samples 
Wipe sample results before and after DBCS 
operation are presented in Appendix A. A total 
of 106 wipe samples were collected on the 
DBCS machine (53 samples were collected 
before and 53 after the machine was in 
operation). All stackers (bins) were included in 
the wipe sampling. All of the wipe samples 
were positive. B. anthracis concentrations before 
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the machine was operated ranged from 50 to 
100 colony forming units per wipe (CFUs/wipe) 
in the feeder, jogger, and reader sections of 
the DBCS, with a mean of 80 CFUs/wipe. 
B. anthracis concentrations in the bin section of 
the DBCS ranged from 4 to 8 x 108 CFUs/wipe, 
with a mean of 1.7 x 107 CFUs/wipe. The 
highest concentration (8 x 108 CFUs/wipe) was 
found on the wipe sample collected from 
bins 167-170. 
 
B. anthracis concentrations after the machine 
was operated ranged from 12 to 3500 CFUs/ 
wipe in the feeder, jogger, and reader sections of 
the DBCS, with a mean of 724 CFUs/wipe. 
B. anthracis concentrations in the bin section 
of the DBCS ranged from 1 to 2.5 x 104 CFUs/ 
wipe, with a mean of 5052 CFUs/wipe. The 
highest concentration (2.5 x 104 CFUs/wipe) 
was found on the wipe samples collected on bins 
155-158 and 167-170. 
Andersen Sampler 
Andersen sampler results before and after DBCS 
operation are presented in Appendix B. Sixty-
five Andersen samples were collected before 
DBCS operation. During the first 2-hour session, 
sample locations 1, 2, 4, and 5 each had positive 
samples. During the 6-hour period, sample 
locations 1 and 5 had a positive sample. Sixty-
four Andersen air samples were collected after 
DBCS operation. During the first 2-hour session, 
all samples collected were positive. During the 
6-hour period, all sampling locations had some 
positive samples. 
 
B. anthracis concentrations before DBCS 
operation ranged from no detectable colonies 
to 7 colony forming units per cubic meter 
(CFUs/m3). The highest concentration 
(7 CFUs/m3) was at location 3 during the 6-hour 
period and location 5 during the first 2-hour 
period. B. anthracis concentrations after the 
DBCS was operated ranged from no detectable 
colonies to 360 CFUs/m3. The highest 
concentration (360 CFUs/m3) was at location 2 
during the 2-hour session. 
Filter Media 
Initial Results 
MCE filter sample results before and after 
DBCS operation are presented in Appendix C. 
All 12 MCE air samples collected before 
DBCS operation were initially negative. Of 
the 12 MCE air samples collected after DBCS 
operation, four were initially positive (locations 
4, 5, and 6 during the 2-hour period and 
location 5 during the 8-hour period). 
 
PTFE filter sample results before and after 
DBCS operation are presented in Appendix D. 
All 12 PTFE air samples collected before 
DBCS operation were initially negative. Of the 
12 PTFE air samples collected after DBCS 
operation, six were initially positive (locations 3, 
4, and 5 during the 2-hour period and 
locations 2, 3, and 4 during the 8-hour period). 
 
GEL filter sample results before and after DBCS 
operation are presented in Appendix E. All 
36 GEL air samples collected before DBCS 
operation were initially negative. Of the 36 GEL 
air samples collected after DBCS operation, 
13 were initially positive (locations 2-6 with 
location 3 having two positive samples during 
the 2-hour period and locations 1-4 and 6 with 
locations 3 and 4 each having two positive 
samples during the 8-hour period). 
 
DFU filter sample results before and after 
DBCS operation are presented in Appendix F. 
All three DFU air samples collected before 
DBCS operation were initially negative. All 
three of the DFU air samples collected after 
DBCS operation were initially positive. 
Results from the Analysis of the 
Remaining Sample 
Mixed Cellulose Ester Filter 
All 12 MCE air samples collected before DBCS 
operation were initially negative. Analysis of 
the remaining portion of these samples indicated 
1 of 12 was positive (at location 5 during the 2-
hour session). Of the eight initially negative 
MCE air samples collected after DBCS 
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operation, analysis of the remaining sample 
indicated all eight were positive. 
 
Figure 2 presents the 2- and 8-hour MCE filter 
data by location for both days of sampling. 
B. anthracis concentrations before DBCS 
operation ranged from no detectable colonies 
to 4 CFUs/m3. The highest concentration (4 
CFUs/m3) was at location 5 during the 2-hour 
session. B. anthracis concentrations after DBCS 
operation ranged from 7 to 400 CFUs/m3. 
The highest concentration (400 CFUs/m3) was at 
location 6 during the 2-hour session. 
Polytetrafluoroethylene Filter 
All 12 PTFE air samples collected before DBCS 
operation were initially negative. Analysis of the 
remaining portion of these samples indicated 1 
of 12 was positive (at location 4 during the 8-
hour session). Of the six initially negative 
PTFE air samples collected after DBCS 
operation, analysis of the remaining sample 
indicated all six were positive. 
 
Figure 3 presents the 2- and 8-hour PTFE filter 
data by location for both days of sampling. 
B. anthracis concentrations before DBCS 
operation ranged from no detectable colonies 
to 1 CFU/m3. The highest concentration 
(1 CFU/m3) was at location 4 during the 8-hour 
session. B. anthracis concentrations after 
DBCS operation ranged from 10 to 
120 CFUs/m3. The highest concentration 
(120 CFUs/m3) was at location 6 during the 
8-hour session. 
Gelatin Filter 
All 36 GEL air samples collected before DBCS 
operation were initially negative. Analysis of 
the remaining portion of these samples indicated 
1 of 36 was positive (at location 3 during one 
of the two 1-hour sessions). Of the 23 initially 
negative GEL air samples collected after DBCS 
operation, analysis of the remaining sample 
indicated 14 were positive (locations 1-2 and 
4-6 with location 1 having two positive samples 
during the 2-hour session and locations 1-6 with 
location 5 having three positive samples during 
the 8-hour period). 
 
Figure 4 presents the 2- and 8-hour GEL filter 
data by location for both days of sampling 
(samples averaged). B. anthracis concentrations 
before DBCS operation ranged from no 
detectable colonies to 5 CFU/m3. The highest 
concentration (5 CFU/m3) was at location 3 
during the 2-hour session. B. anthracis 
concentrations after DBCS operation ranged 
from 11 to 84 CFUs/m3. The highest 
concentration (84 CFUs/m3) was at location 5 
during the 2-hour session. 
Dry Filter Unit Filter 
All three initially negative DFU air samples 
collected before DBCS operation were positive 
after analysis of the remaining portion of the 
sample. 
 
Figure 5 presents the 2- and 8-hour DFU filter 
data by location for both days of sampling. 
B. anthracis concentrations before DBCS 
operation were all less than 1 CFU/m3. B. 
anthracis concentrations after DBCS operation 
ranged from 5 to 15 CFUs/m3. The highest 
concentration (15 CFUs/m3) was from the filter 
in the modified DFU, which operated for a 
2-hour session. 
Test Deck Sheets 
“Test deck” information is presented in Table 1 
and results are provided in Appendix G. One of 
the ten sheets was positive (1 CFU) from the 
initial analysis. Of the nine initially negative 
sheets, analysis of the remaining portion of these 
samples indicated all six were positive (range of 
1 to 5 CFUs). 
Statistical Analysis 
The airborne B. anthracis concentrations 
collected with Andersen samplers were log-
transformed to perform statistical analyses. A 
multiple regression analysis was performed on 
the data to describe the relationship between log-
transformed concentration, time of sample 
collection, and location of sample collection. 
Results indicate that the only statistically 
significant covariate was time (P-value 
< 0.0001). The final mathematical model is 
presented graphically in Figure 7. Since the 
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factors (“location” and the interaction term 
[location x time]) were not statistically 
significant, regression lines grouped by location 
were not statistically different from each other 
and the parameter estimates (slope and intercept) 
from individual regression lines were not 
statistically different from each other. Therefore, 
grouping data from all locations into one 
regression model was appropriate and the final 
model can be used to describe B. anthracis 
concentrations. 
 
Figures 6 and 7 show the decay curves, 
including the regression curve, of the Andersen 
sampler results before and after DBCS 
operation (raw data and log-transformed 
data, respectively). The regression model 
(subsequently referred to as the Andersen decay 
curve) above was used to calculate 2- and 
8-hour TWA concentrations based upon 
Andersen sampler data from five different 
locations in containment. The 2- and 8-hour 
predicted concentrations based on this model 





The wipe sampling data should be viewed as 
semi-quantitative since there was not a 
quantitatively defined area of collection. 
However, persons collecting wipe samples were 
instructed to wipe the bin and its surrounding 
surfaces in a manner which created a relatively 
consistent collection area. The initial round of 
wipe samples (before DBCS operation) may 
have reduced the surface loading of B. anthracis 
spores resulting in the observed reduction in 
concentrations. While it is unknown how 
this reduction may have impacted the air 
concentrations, NIOSH investigators believe it 
was minimal since spore dissemination was 
probably due to mechanical action of the belts 
and pinch rollers as opposed to test envelopes 
collecting in receiving bins. 
 
The positive air samples before DBCS operation 
suggest that walking and light work may be 
sufficient to re-aerosolize B. anthracis spores. 
Additionally, there does not appear to be a 
single event that re-aerosolized spores since the 
positive air samples were found at various 
locations in the beginning, middle, and end of 
the 8-hour sampling period. 
 
Analysis of the remaining portion of the initially 
negative filter samples resulted in additional 
positive samples. Therefore, if the entire sample 
is not analyzed, there is a potential for false 
negative results (recalling that the initial analysis 
of filter media samples used only 10% of 
the sample). This can play a significant role in 
the selection of air sampling methodologies 
when considering the intent of sampling, e.g., 
screening, characterization, or clearance. 
 
The positive air samples collected before and 
after DBCS operation demonstrate that all 
evaluated sample methods are capable of 
collecting B. anthracis spores and that re-
aerosolization of B. anthracis spores by 
mechanical disruption is possible. Additionally, 
the positive results of the initial air sampling 
suggest that all evaluated methods are capable 
of collecting B. anthracis spores at low 
concentrations. Of the samples collected before 
DBCS operation, the Andersen appeared to be 
more sensitive than other air sampling methods. 
Additional advantages of the Andersen sampler 
include lower risk processing for the laboratory, 
quicker turn-around time, and less laboratory 
bias due to reduced sample processing. A 
disadvantage of the Andersen sampler is that the 
maximum sample collection time is limited to 
20 minutes, depending upon the concentration. 
Operating this instrument is a labor-intensive, 
time-consuming process when compared to 
sampling with filters where one sample can be 
collected over long time periods, (hours). 
 
The objective of the statistical analysis of 
Andersen sampler results was to assess the effect 
of sample location and time on B. anthracis 
concentration. The decline in B. anthracis 
concentration over time can be attributed to the 
influence of the pumps in effectively filtering 
the air inside the containment and the 
contribution of spore settling. 
 
As part of the investigation into the pump 
influence in filtering containment air, theoretical 
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B. anthracis concentration curves were 
developed for the Andersen sampler, DFU, and 
the other filter media (combination of MCE, 
PTFE, and GEL) based on a purging equation 
for dilution ventilation, factoring in time, 
containment volume, and ventilation rate (in this 
case a collection rate).20 B. anthracis 
concentrations and a decay curve were also 
established for the particle loss (spore settling) 
contribution.21 For this calculation, it was 
assumed that there was uniform stirring of 
spores in the containment, spores inside the 
containment were 1 µm in diameter,22,23 and the 
spore density was 1.1 g/cm3.24 
 
The 8-hour decay curve (Figure 6) reflects two 
distinct periods: (1) the first 2-hrs inside the 
containment when five Andersen samplers, three 
DFUs, and 36 pumps for MCE, PTFE, and GEL 
filter media were operating, totaling 1414 lpm 
and (2) the next 6-hour period when one DFU, 
18 pumps for MCE, PTFE, and GEL filter 
media, and five Andersen samplers (one ten-
minute session every two hours) were operating, 
totaling 578 lpm and 436 lpm when the 
Andersen samplers were in use and not in use, 
respectively. Additionally, it is assumed that 
the Andersen data (Figure 6) reflects the 
B. anthracis concentration inside the 
containment at the start of sampling (1st event) 
and at the 2-hour point (start of 2nd event). 
Specifically, the initial B. anthracis 
concentrations used for the first and second 
event were 245 CFU/m3 and 60 CFU/m3, 
respectively. 
 
Figures 8 and 9 present the theoretical curves for 
each set of air sampling media (Andersen, DFU, 
other media), the settling curve, as well as a 
curve which combines all the sampling media 
representing the overall removal rate (the 
reduction or capture of B. anthracis in 
containment). The decay curves in both figures 
indicate that based on removal rate, the DFU 
would be expected to have more of an impact 
on the reduction of B. anthracis inside the 
containment than the other sampling media and 
may have influenced the capture potential of the 
other sampling media inside the containment. 
 
Using the decay curves (Figures 8 and 9) and the 
data generated from the calculations above, an 
additional decay curve was generated for the two 
events and is presented in Figures 10 and 11. 
This curve is the combined effect that each set 
of air sampling media and spore settling 
provide to the overall decrease in B. anthracis 
concentration inside containment. The Andersen 
decay curve and the theoretical DFU decay 
curve are also provided to offer a visual 
reference for comparison. Assuming that the 
Andersen decay curve provides a time indication 
of the B. anthracis concentration in containment, 
the combined decay curve reflects the general 
trend shown by the Andersen sampler. 
 
In the investigation of the Andersen sampler 
decay curve, the assumption was made that 
the B. anthracis spores were 1 µm in diameter. 
However, there is the possibility of 
agglomeration of spores into a particle greater 
than 1 µm in diameter. The larger particle size 
would result in a settling curve showing a 
sharper decrease in overall B. anthracis 
concentration inside containment over time. 
Subsequently, the combined decay curve would 
also indicate this decrease in concentration. 
Previous study into B. anthracis reaerosolization 
in the Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, 
D.C. suggests that 80% of B. anthracis spores 
ranged from 0.95 µm to 3.5 µm.25 It is 
reasonable to suspect that B. anthracis spores in 
the TPDC also fall into this size range. 
However, size discrimination inside the TPDC is 
unknown. 
 
Figures 8-11 suggest that the removal rate of the 
DFU (which is presumed high based on the large 
volume of air that is run through these samplers) 
would have a “cleansing” effect (removal of 
material) inside the containment. However, the 
B. anthracis concentrations were considerably 
lower than any of the other sampling methods. 
This may be indicative of spores passing through 
the filter due to the flow rate, spores passing 
around the filter due to a poor seal, and/or spores 
becoming imbedded in the filter to a degree 
where typical laboratory sample preparation was 
unable to extract them. This raises a concern 
with the reliability of quantitative data from the 
polyester felt filter. A second concern stems 
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from the extraction efficiency associated with 
each type of filter media. In general, as the 
extraction efficiency decreases so does the 
precision of the data, which can significantly 
impact the limit of detection for that analytical 
method. For example, a low airborne 
concentration may not provide enough spores 
for collection to overcome the limit of detection, 
resulting in the possibility of false negative 
results. 
 
Further laboratory and field evaluation of these 
and other methods is necessary to under-
stand their practical uses and limitations for 
the collection of B. anthracis in facilities 
contaminated from bioterrorist events. 
Analytical methods must be validated, including 
studies of the extraction efficiencies of sample 
collection matrices, to ensure consistent and 
reliable results from response laboratories. 
Greater confidence in environmental 
measurements can result in better informed 




1. Although all types of air sampling media 
were capable of collecting B. anthracis spores 
before and after DBCS operation, the Andersen 
sampler appeared to be the most sensitive. 
 
2. The DFUs were capable of sampling a 
substantial volume of air over extended time 
periods. However, compared to the B. anthracis 
concentrations found by the other sampling 
media, the low DFU concentrations suggest that 
spores may have passed through the instrument 
uncollected and/or spores were imbedded in the 
filter too deeply to be extracted. 
 
3. Re-aerosolization of B. anthracis spores is 
possible and may occur from merely walking or 
conducting light work in a contaminated area. 
 
4. The positive results for the ten “test deck” 
sheets suggests that it is possible for 
B. anthracis spores to adhere to sheets moving 
through an operating DBCS. 
 
5. Further investigation into air sampling and 
analytical methods, specifically sample 
collection and extraction efficiencies, is 
necessary to have confidence in their reliability 





NIOSH investigators provide the following 
recommendations based on findings from this 
investigation. 
 
1. When air sampling is to be utilized for 
screening, characterizing, and/or clearing a 
B. anthracis-contaminated facility for re-
occupancy, the Andersen sampler should be one 
of the instruments used. 
 
2. When collecting B. anthracis using filter 
media, the entire filter should be analyzed to 
obtain the greatest sensitivity. 
 
3. Laboratory and field evaluation of the 
methods used in this investigation and other 
methods available, as well as research into 
future air sampling methodologies, must be 
continued to provide bioterrorism responders the 
best available instruments to detect not only 
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Abbreviations and Symbols Used in the Following Tables, Figures, and Appendices 
 
DBCS  = delivery bar code sorter 
MCE  = mixed-cellulose ester filter 
PTFE  = polytetrafluorethylene filter 
GEL  = gelatin filter 
DFU  = dry filter unit 
pos  = positive sample (detectable colonies) 
neg  = negative sample (no detectable colonies) 
tot  = total number of samples 
min  = minutes 
hr  = hour 
n/a  = not applicable 
CFUs  = colony forming units 
CFU/m3 = colony forming units per cubic meter of air 
*  = two sequential samples @ 60 min each 
**  = four sequential samples @ 120 min each 
$  = 10% of the sample extract was analyzed 
  = sample(s) were initially positive; therefore, no further analysis 
†  = ten sequential samples @ 10 min each @ five locations 
††  = one ten minute sample every 2 hours @ five locations 
n/a  = not applicable (100% of the sample was initially analyzed) 
theo  = theoretical curve (see Discussion Section) 
calc  = calculated curve (see Discussion Section) 
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Table 1. DBCS Operation and Test Kit Information (bins sheets sent to) 
 
Start Time Bins Start Time Bins 
0927 Machine Start - 1, 2, 3 0956 32, 33, 34, 35 
0934 Machine Jam 0958 64, 65, 66, 67, 190 
0938 32, 33, 34 1000 96, 97, 98, 99 
0940 32, 33, 34, 35 1004 1, 2, 3 
0941 64, 65, 66, 67 1006 32, 33, 34, 35 
0943 96, 97, 98, 99 1008 64, 65, 66, 67 
0944 Machine Jam 1010 96, 97, 98, 99 
0945 1, 2, 3 1012 1, 2, 3 
0947 32, 33, 34, 35 1013 32, 33, 34, 35, 187, 188, 
190 
0948 64, 65, 66, 67 1017 64, 65, 66, 67 
0949 96, 97, 98, 99 1019 96 
0954 1, 2, 3 1020 Machine Stop 
Total Sheets Run Through Machine = 6521 
  
Page 14  Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2002-0109-2927 
 
Table 2. Initial Sampling Results for B. anthracis Presented By Location Before and After DBCS Operation 
 
Test Description:  Air Sampling Before DBCS Operation (Test Duration:  60, 120, and 480 minutes) 
Gel Filters MCE Filter PTFE Filter Andersen DFU Sampler 
60 min 120 min 120 min 120 min 120 min 120 min 480 min 120 min 480 min †120 min ††360 min 120 min 480 min 
 
Totals per Location 
Sample Location 
Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot 
1 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 10 1 3 –– –– –– –– 3 23 
2 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 2 10 0 3 –– –– –– –– 2 23 
3 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 10 2 3 –– –– –– –– 2 23 
4 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 10 0 3 0 1 –– –– 1 24 
5 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 3 10 1 3 0 1 –– –– 4 24 
6 0 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 –– –– –– –– –– –– 0 1 0 11 
Totals per Test 0 12 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 0 6 8 50 4 15 0 2 0 1 12 128 
 
Test Description:  Air Sampling After DBCS Operation (Test Duration:  60, 120 and 480 minutes) 
Gel Filters MCE Filter PTFE Filter Andersen DFU Sampler 
60 min 120 min 120 min 120 min 120 min 120 min 480 min 120 min 480 min †120 min ††360 min 120 min 480 min 
 
Totals per Location 
Sample Location 
Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot Pos Tot 
1 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 9 9 1 3 –– –– –– –– 11 22 
2 1 2 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 10 10 3 3 –– –– –– –– 16 23 
3 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 10 10 2 3 –– –– –– –– 18 23 
4 1 2 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 10 10 2 3 1 1 –– –– 19 24 
5 1 2 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 10 10 2 3 1 1 –– –– 17 24 
6 1 2 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 –– –– –– –– –– –– 1 1 4 11 
Totals per Test 6 12 4 6 3 6 0 6 0 6 3 6 1 6 3 6 3 6 49 49 10 15 2 2 1 1 85 127 
†Sample media changed every 10 min for the 120 min sampling period ††360 min sampling period, samples were collected every two hours for 10 min.
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% Positive % Positive % Positive % Positive 
120 min 0% (0 of 6) 17% (1 of 6) 50% (3 of 6) 100% (3 of 3) MCE 
480 min 0% (0 of 6) 0% (0 of 6) 17% (1 of 6) 100% (5 of 5) 
120 min 0% (0 of 6) 0% (0 of 6) 50% (3 of 6) 100% (3 of 3) PTFE 
480 min 0% (0 of 6) 17% (1 of 6) 50% (3 of 6) 100% (3 of 3) 
120 min* 0% (0 of 12) 8% (1 of 12) 50% (6 of 12) 100% (6 of 6) Gel 
480 min** 0% (0 of 24) 0% (0 of 24) 29% (7 of 24) 47% (8 of 17) 
120 min 0% (0 of 2) 100% (2 of 2) 100% (2 of 2)  DFU 
480 min 0% (0 of 1) 100% (1 of 1) 100% (1 of 1)  
120 min† 16% (8 of 50) n/a 100% (49 of 49) n/a Andersen 
360 min†† 27% (4 of 15) n/a 67% (10 of 15) n/a 
* = two sequential samples @ 60 min each 
** = four sequential samples @ 120 min each 
 = all samples were initially positive; therefore, no further analysis 
† = ten sequential samples @ 10 min each @ five locations 
†† = one sample every 2 hours @ five locations 
n/a = not applicable (100% of the sample was initially analyzed) 
 
  




















= Dry Filter Unit (DFU)
≈70’
≈15’
Sample locations 1 through 6 contained MCE, PTFE, and GEL filters; while  
Andersen samples were located at 1-5. 
Modified DFU
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Figures 2 and 3. 2-hour and 8-hour Filter Sample B. anthracis Concentrations 
 
MCE Filters
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Figures 4 and 5. 2-hour and 8-hour Filter Sample B. anthracis Concentrations 
 
GEL Filters
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Figures 6 and 7. Andersen Sampler Decay Curves. 
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Figures 8 and 9. Rate of Purging and Settling Equations. 
 
Theoretical Concentration Decay Curves
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Figures 10 and 11. Combined Theoretical Decay Curve and Reference Curves. 
 
Concentration Decay Curves
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A. Wipe Sample Results for B. anthracis 
 
Before DBCS Machine in Operation 
Sample Location Sample # Concentration (CFUs) 
Jogger - table and frame Wipe - 001 100 
Feeder - transport and frame (front) Wipe - 002 100 
Feeder - transport (interior, back) Wipe - 003 52 
Reader (interior) - front section Wipe - 004 100 
Reader (interior) - back section Wipe - 005 50 
Column 1, bins 1-3 and printer Wipe - 006 11 
Column 2, bins 4-7 Wipe - 007 33 
Column 3, bins 8-11 Wipe - 008 50 
Column 4, bins 12-15 Wipe - 009 4 
Column 5, bins 16-19 Wipe - 010 10 
Column 6, bins 20-23 Wipe - 011 14 
Column 7, bins 24-27 Wipe - 012 22 
Column 8, bins 28-31 Wipe - 013 13 
Column 9, bins 32-35 Wipe - 014 19 
Column 10, bins 36-39 Wipe - 015 23 
Column 11, bins 40-43 Wipe - 016 28 
Column 12, bins 44-47 Wipe - 017 104 
Column 13, bins 48-51 Wipe - 018 68 
Column 14, bins 52-55 Wipe - 019 63 
Column 15, bins 56-59 Wipe - 020 37 
Column 16, bins 60-63 Wipe - 021 40 
Column 17, bins 64-67 Wipe - 022 68 
Column 18, bins 68-71 Wipe - 023 67 
Column 19, bins 72-75 Wipe - 024 124 
Column 20, bins 76-79 Wipe - 057 17 
Column 21, bins 80-83 Wipe - 058 10 
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Appendix A. Wipe Sample Results for B. anthracis 
 
Before DBCS Machine in Operation 
Sample Location Sample # Concentration (CFUs) 
Column 22, bins 84-87 Wipe - 059 19 
Column 23, bins 88-91 Wipe - 060 69 
Column 24, bins 92-95 Wipe - 056 51 
Column 25, bins 96-99 Wipe - 025 180 
Column 26, bins 100-103 Wipe - 026 110 
Column 27, bins 104-107 Wipe - 027 540 
Column 28, bins 108-111 Wipe - 028 320 
Column 29, bins 112-114 Wipe - 029 700 
Column 30, bins 115-118 Wipe - 030 1,600 
Column 31, bins 119-122 Wipe - 031 28,000 
Column 32, bins 123-126 Wipe - 032 48,000 
Column 33, bins 127-130 Wipe - 033 28,000 
Column 34, bins 131-134 Wipe - 034 68,000 
Column 35, bins 135-138 Wipe - 035 110,000 
Column 36, bins 139-142 Wipe - 036 750,000 
Column 37, bins 143-146 Wipe - 037 600,000 
Column 38, bins 147-150 Wipe - 038 690,000 
Column 39, bins 151-154 Wipe - 039 1,500,000 
Column 40, bins 155-158 Wipe - 040 2,000,000 
Column 41, bins 159-162 Wipe - 041 6,300,000 
Column 42, bins 163-166 Wipe - 042 690,000 
Column 43, bins 167-170 Wipe - 043 800,000,000 
Column 44, bins 171-174 Wipe - 044 130,000 
Column 45, bins 175-178 Wipe - 045 60,000 
Column 46, bins 179-182 Wipe - 046 110,000 
Column 47, bins 183-186 Wipe - 047 21,000 
Column 48, bins 187-190 Wipe - 048 70,000 
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Appendix A. Wipe Sample Results for B. anthracis 
 
After DBCS Machine in Operation 
Sample Location Sample # Concentration (CFUs) 
Jogger - table and frame Wipe - 116 26 
Feeder table (open end) Wipe - 117 12 
Feeder assembly (interior) Wipe - 118 27 
Reader (interior) - front section Wipe - 119 57 
Reader (interior) - back section Wipe - 120 3,500 
Column 1, bins 1-3 Wipe - 061 3 
Column 2, bins 4-7 Wipe - 062 32 
Column 3, bins 8-11 Wipe - 063 45 
Column 4, bins 12-15 Wipe - 064 7 
Column 5, bins 16-19 Wipe - 065 18 
Column 6, bins 20-23 Wipe - 066 68 
Column 7, bins 24-27 Wipe - 067 17 
Column 8, bins 28-31 Wipe - 068 6 
Column 9, bins 32-35 Wipe - 069 22 
Column 10, bins 36-39 Wipe - 070 6 
Column 11, bins 40-43 Wipe - 071 15 
Column 12, bins 44-47 Wipe - 072 1 
Column 13, bins 48-51 Wipe - 073 15 
Column 14, bins 52-55 Wipe - 074 5 
Column 15, bins 56-59 Wipe - 075 22 
Column 16, bins 60-63 Wipe - 076 70 
Column 17, bins 64-67 Wipe - 077 100 
Column 18, bins 68-71 Wipe - 078 49 
Column 19, bins 72-75 Wipe - 079 32 
Column 20, bins 76-79 Wipe - 080 56 
Column 21, bins 80-83 Wipe - 081 17 
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Appendix A. Wipe Sample Results for B. anthracis 
 
After DBCS Machine in Operation 
Sample Location Sample # Concentration (CFUs) 
Column 22, bins 84-87 Wipe - 082 26 
Column 23, bins 88-91 Wipe - 083 111 
Column 24, bins 92-95 Wipe - 084 123 
Column 25, bins 96-99 Wipe - 085 97 
Column 26, bins 100-103 Wipe - 086 150 
Column 27, bins 104-107 Wipe - 087 3,200 
Column 28, bins 108-111 Wipe - 089 1,800 
Column 29, bins 112-114 Wipe - 088 5,200 
Column 30, bins 115-118 Wipe - 090 5,700 
Column 31, bins 119-122 Wipe - 091 15,000 
Column 32, bins 123-126 Wipe - 092 6,500 
Column 33, bins 127-130 Wipe - 093 12,000 
Column 34, bins 131-134 Wipe - 094 9,800 
Column 35, bins 135-138 Wipe - 095 12,000 
Column 36, bins 139-142 Wipe - 096 20,000 
Column 37, bins 143-146 Wipe - 097 11,000 
Column 38, bins 147-150 Wipe - 098 12,000 
Column 39, bins 151-154 Wipe - 099 11,000 
Column 40, bins 155-158 Wipe - 100 25,000 
Column 41, bins 159-162 Wipe - 101 13,000 
Column 42, bins 163-166 Wipe - 102 20,000 
Column 43, bins 167-170 Wipe - 103 25,000 
Column 44, bins 171-174 Wipe - 104 8,000 
Column 45, bins 175-178 Wipe - 105 3,500 
Column 46, bins 179-182 Wipe - 106 8,700 
Column 47, bins 183-186 Wipe - 107 6,200 
Column 48, bins 187-190 Wipe - 108 6,800 
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Appendix B. Andersen Sampler Air Sampling Results for 
B. anthracis 
Before DBCS Machine in Operation 






SBA - 054 1 0948 - 0958 280 4 
SBA - 053 1 1006 - 1016 280 0 
SBA - 060 1 1020 - 1030 280 0 
SBA - 044 1 1049 - 1102 364 3 
SBA - 025 1 1102 - 1112 280 0 
SBA - 018 1 1120 - 1130 280 0 
SBA - 005 1 1135 - 1145 280 0 
SBA - 032 1 1153 - 1203 280 0 
SBA - 034 1 1211 - 1221 280 0 
SBA - 029 1 1229 - 1239 280 0 
SBA - 013 1 1350 - 1400 280 0 
SBA - 017 1 1554 - 1604 280 0 
SBA - 071 1 1710 - 1720 280 4 
SBA - 055 2 0947 - 0958 308 0 
SBA - 052 2 1006 - 1016 280 0 
SBA - 059 2 1033 - 1043 280 0 
SBA - 042 2 1049 - 1102 364 0 
SBA - 024 2 1102 - 1112 280 0 
SBA - 022 2 1120 - 1130 280 0 
SBA - 019 2 1135 - 1145 280 4 
SBA - 020 2 1153 - 1203 280 4 
SBA - 010 2 1211 - 1221 280 0 
SBA - 049 2 1229 - 1239 280 0 
SBA - 003 2 1350 - 1400 280 0 
SBA - 016 2 1554 - 1604 280 0 
SBA - 070 2 1710 - 1720 280 0 
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Appendix B. Andersen Sampler Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
 
Before DBCS Machine in Operation 






SBA - 056 3 0947 - 0958 308 0 
SBA - 051 3 1006 - 1016 280 0 
SBA - 041 3 1020 - 1030 280 0 
SBA - 043 3 1049 - 1102 364 0 
SBA - 038 3 1102 - 1112 280 0 
SBA - 004 3 1120 - 1130 280 0 
SBA - 006 3 1135 - 1145 280 0 
SBA - 033 3 1153 - 1203 280 0 
SBA - 011 3 1211 - 1221 280 0 
SBA - 001 3 1229 - 1239 280 0 
SBA - 002 3 1350 - 1400 280 4 
SBA - 050 3 1554 - 1604 280 0 
SBA - 073 3 1710 - 1720 280 7 
SBA - 057 4 0947 - 0958 308 0 
SBA - 048 4 1006 - 1016 280 0 
SBA - 046 4 1033 - 1043 280 0 
SBA - 036 4 1049 - 1102 364 0 
SBA - 037 4 1102 - 1112 280 4 
SBA - 021 4 1120 - 1130 280 0 
SBA - 031 4 1135 - 1145 280 0 
SBA - 039 4 1153 - 1203 280 0 
SBA - 009 4 1211 - 1221 280 0 
SBA - 014 4 1229 - 1239 280 0 
SBA - 015 4 1350 - 1400 280 0 
SBA - 079 4 1554 - 1604 280 0 
SBA - 072 4 1710 - 1720 280 0 
  
Page 28  Health Hazard Evaluation Report No. 2002-0109-2927 
 
Appendix B. Andersen Sampler Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
 
Before DBCS Machine in Operation 






SBA - 058 5 0947 - 1058 308 3 
SBA - 047 5 1006 - 1016 280 4 
SBA - 045 5 1033 - 1043 280 0 
SBA - 035 5 1049 - 1102 364 0 
SBA - 023 5 1102 - 1112 280 0 
SBA - 027 5 1120 - 1130 280 0 
SBA - 007 5 1135 - 1145 280 0 
SBA - 008 5 1153 - 1203 280 0 
SBA - 028 5 1211 - 1221 280 7 
SBA - 030 5 1229 - 1239 280 0 
SBA - 012 5 1350 - 1400 280 0 
SBA - 077 5 1554 - 1604 280 0 
SBA - 080 5 1710 - 1720 280 4 
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Appendix B. Andersen Sampler Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
 
After DBCS Machine in Operation 






SBA - 103 1 0931 - 0941 280 159 
SBA - 131 1 0947 - 0957 280 297 
SBA - 125 1 0958 - 1008 280 244 
SBA - 154 1 1011 - 1021 280 no impact holes 
(blank) 
SBA - 152 1 1023 - 1033 280 141 
SBA - 118 1 1036 - 1046 280 127 
SBA - 123 1 1049 - 1059 280 14 
SBA - 107 1 1102 - 1112 280 85 
SBA - 093 1 1114 - 1125 308 45 
SBA - 082 1 1133 - 1143 280 32 
SBA - 134 1 1330 - 1340 280 21 
SBA - 150 1 1532 - 1542 280 0 
SBA - 146 1 1703 - 1713 280 0 
SBA - 109 2 0931 - 0941 280 360 
SBA - 129 2 0947 - 0957 280 300 
SBA - 127 2 0958 - 1008 280 226 
SBA - 159 2 1011 - 1021 280 223 
SBA - 115 2 1023 - 1033 280 191 
SBA - 114 2 1036 - 1046 280 141 
SBA - 111 2 1049 - 1059 280 99 
SBA - 143 2 1102 - 1112 280 92 
SBA - 158 2 1114 - 1125 308 67 
SBA - 089 2 1133 - 1143 280 49 
SBA - 094 2 1330 - 1340 280 4 
SBA - 148 2 1532 - 1542 280 4 
SBA - 145 2 1703 - 1713 280 7 
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Appendix B. Andersen Sampler Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
After DBCS Machine in Operation 






SBA - 104 3 0931 - 0941 280 219 
SBA - 130 3 0947 - 0957 280 251 
SBA - 138 3 0958 - 1008 280 230 
SBA - 153 3 1011 - 1021 280 170 
SBA - 140 3 1023 - 1033 280 159 
SBA - 105 3 1036 - 1046 280 95 
SBA - 155 3 1049 - 1059 280 78 
SBA - 157 3 1102 - 1112 280 74 
SBA - 144 3 1114 - 1125 308 58 
SBA - 084 3 1133 - 1143 280 25 
SBA - 122 3 1330 - 1340 280 14 
SBA - 126 3 1532 - 1542 280 0 
SBA - 135 3 1703 - 1713 280 7 
SBA - 110 4 0931 - 0941 280 300 
SBA - 116 4 0947 - 0957 280 233 
SBA - 117 4 0958 - 1008 280 223 
SBA - 100 4 1011 - 1021 280 205 
SBA - 120 4 1023 - 1033 280 194 
SBA - 097 4 1036 - 1046 280 194 
SBA - 151 4 1049 - 1059 280 95 
SBA - 147 4 1102 - 1112 280 46 
SBA - 142 4 1114 - 1125 308 77 
SBA - 112 4 1133 - 1143 280 21 
SBA - 096 4 1330 - 1340 280 14 
SBA - 133 4 1532 - 1542 280 0 
SBA - 136 4 1703 - 1713 280 4 
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Appendix B. Andersen Sampler Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
After DBCS Machine in Operation 






SBA - 102 5 0931 - 0941 280 353 
SBA - 128 5 0947 - 0957 280 346 
SBA - 139 5 0958 - 1008 280 247 
SBA - 101 5 1011 - 1021 280 240 
SBA - 119 5 1023 - 1033 280 205 
SBA - 121 5 1036 - 1046 280 134 
SBA - 160 5 1049 - 1059 308 71 
SBA - 091 5 1102 - 1112 280 102 
SBA - 141 5 1114 - 1125 308 64 
SBA - 113 5 1133 - 1143 280 49 
SBA - 124 5 1330 - 1340 280 11 
SBA - 108 5 1532 - 1542 280 4 
SBA - 137 5 1703 - 1713 280 0 
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Appendix C. Mixed-Cellulose Ester Filter Air Sampling 
Results for B. anthracis 
 
Before DBCS Machine in Operation 










MCE - 004 1 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
MCE - 001 1 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
MCE - 007 2 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
MCE - 003 2 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
MCE - 005 3 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
MCE - 011 3 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
MCE - 019 4 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
MCE - 006 4 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
MCE - 009 5 0949 - 1145 232 0 4 
MCE - 018 5 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
MCE - 013 6 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
MCE - 016 6 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
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Appendix C. Mixed-Cellulose Ester Filter Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
 
After DBCS Machine in Operation 










MCE - 038 1 0927 - 1130 246 0 49 
MCE - 025 1 0927 - 1734 974 0 28 
MCE - 030 2 0927 - 1140 266 0 64 
MCE - 036 2 0927 - 1730 966 0 7 
MCE - 035 3 0927 - 1134 254 0 31 
MCE - 029 3 0927 - 1731 968 0 7 
MCE - 032 4 0927 - 1135 256 4  
MCE - 031 4 0927 - 1732 970 0 11 
MCE - 021 5 0927 - 1138 262 4  
MCE - 022 5 0927 - 1728 962 1  
MCE - 023 6 0927 - 1132 250 40  
MCE - 026 6 0927 - 1734 974 0 38 
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Appendix D. Polytetrafluoroethylene Filter Air Sampling 
Results for B. anthracis 
 
Before DBCS Machine  in Operation 










PTFE - 004 1 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
PTFE - 001 1 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
PTFE - 007 2 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
PTFE - 006 2 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
PTFE - 015 3 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
PTFE - 013 3 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
PTFE - 017 4 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
PTFE - 009 4 0949 - 1724 910 0 1 
PTFE - 003 5 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
PTFE - 008 5 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
PTFE - 002 6 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
PTFE - 014 6 0949 - 1724 910 0 0 
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Appendix D. Polytetrafluoroethylene Filter Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
 
After DBCS Machine in Operation 










PTFE - 038 1 0927 - 1131 248 0 56 
PTFE - 022 1 0927 - 1734 974 0 26 
PTFE - 030 2 0927 - 1134 254 0 98 
PTFE - 031 2 0927 - 1730 966 3  
PTFE - 029 3 0927 - 1134 254 4  
PTFE - 039 3 0927 - 1731 968 1  
PTFE - 025 4 0927 - 1135 256 4  
PTFE - 040 4 0927 - 1732 970 3  
PTFE - 027 5 0927 - 1138 262 4  
PTFE - 026 5 0927 - 1728 962 0 16 
PTFE - 036 6 0927 - 1132 250 0 120 
PTFE - 037 6 0927 - 1734 974 0 39 
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Appendix E. Gelatin Filter Air Sampling Results for 
B. anthracis 
 
Before DBCS Machine in Operation 










GEL - 027 1 0949 - 1050 122 0 0 
GEL - 001 1 1050 - 1145 110 0 0 
GEL - 019 1 0949 - 1145 232 0 0 
GEL - 031 1 1145 - 1351 252 0 0 
GEL - 025 1 1351 - 1548 234 0 0 
GEL - 026 1 1548 - 1724 192 0 0 
GEL - 020 2 0949 - 1051 124 0 0 
GEL - 009 2 1051 - 1145 108 0 0 
GEL - 008 2 0949 - 1148 238 0 0 
GEL - 013 2 1148 - 1355 254 0 0 
GEL - 036 2 1356 - 1549 226 0 0 
GEL - 022 2 1549 - 1724 190 0 0 
GEL - 018 3 0949 - 1052 126 0 0 
GEL - 002 3 1052 - 1145 106 0 9 
GEL - 004 3 0949 - 1149 240 0 0 
GEL - 023 3 1149 - 1358 258 0 0 
GEL - 030 3 1358 - 1550 224 0 0 
GEL - 038 3 1550 - 1724 188 0 0 
GEL - 006 4 0949 - 1053 128 0 0 
GEL - 010 4 1053 - 1145 104 0 0 
GEL - 011 4 0949 - 1130 202 0 0 
GEL - 015 4 1150 - 1358 256 0 0 
GEL - 021 4 1358 - 1551 226 0 0 
GEL - 028 4 1551 - 1724 186 0 0 
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Appendix E. Gelatin Filter Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
 
Before DBCS Machine in Operation 










GEL - 007 5 0949 - 1054 130 0 0 
GEL - 005 5 1054 - 1145 102 0 0 
GEL - 016 5 0949 - 1151 244 0 0 
GEL - 012 5 1151 - 1402 262 0 0 
GEL - 037 5 1404 - 1551 214 0 0 
GEL - 029 5 1552 - 1724 184 0 0 
GEL - 003 6 0949 - 1055 132 0 0 
GEL - 014 6 1056 - 1145 98 0 0 
GEL - 017 6 0949 - 1152 246 0 0 
GEL - 032 6 1152 - 1404 264 0 0 
GEL - 035 6 1404 - 1553 218 0 0 
GEL - 024 6 1554 - 1724 180 0 0 
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Appendix E. Gelatin Filter Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
 
After DBCS Machine in Operation 










GEL - 098 1 0927 - 1027 120 0 75 
GEL - 079 1 1027 - 1130 126 0 40 
GEL - 096 1 0927 - 1128 242 4  
GEL - 067 1 1128 - 1321 226 0 4 
GEL - 064 1 1322 - 1521 238 0 0 
GEL - 063 1 1521 - 1734 266 0 0 
GEL - 089 2 0927 - 1029 124 8  
GEL - 094 2 1029 - 1140 142 0 56 
GEL - 090 2 0927 - 1140 272 0 120 
GEL - 075 2 1140 - 1322 204 5  
GEL - 070 2 1323 - 1522 238 0 0 
GEL - 074 2 1522 - 1730 256 0 0 
GEL - 100 3 0927 - 1027 120 8  
GEL - 076 3 1027 - 1134 134 7  
GEL - 085 3 0927 - 1135 256 8  
GEL - 077 3 1135 - 1323 216 5  
GEL - 095 3 1324 - 1522 236 0 4 
GEL - 065 3 1523 - 1731 256 0 0 
GEL - 062 4 0927 - 1027 120 8  
GEL - 081 4 1027 - 1135 136 0 37 
GEL - 080 4 0927 - 1135 256 4  
GEL - 071 4 1136 - 1324 216 5  
GEL - 088 4 1324 - 1523 238 0 4 
GEL - 099 4 1524 - 1732 256 0 0 
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Appendix E. Gelatin Filter Air Sampling Results for B. anthracis 
 
After DBCS Machine in Operation 










GEL - 072 5 0927 - 1028 122 8  
GEL - 092 5 1028 - 1137 138 0 87 
GEL - 073 5 0927 - 1139 264 0 80 
GEL - 066 5 1140 - 1325 210 0 10 
GEL - 068 5 1325 - 1524 238 0 4 
GEL - 084 5 1525 - 1728 246 0 0 
GEL - 086 6 0927 - 1028 122 8  
GEL - 083 6 1028 - 1132 128 0 8 
GEL - 061 6 0927 - 1133 252 4  
GEL - 091 6 1133 - 1326 226 0 18 
GEL - 069 6 1326 - 1526 240 0 0 
GEL - 082 6 1526 - 1734 256 0 0 
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Appendix F. Dry Filter Unit Air Sampling Results for 
B. anthracis 
 
Before DBCS Machine in Operation 










DFU - 001 4 0949 - 1153 49,600 0 < 1 
DFU - 015 5 0949 - 1153 49,600 0 < 1 








After DBCS Machine in Operation 










DFU - 008 4 0927 - 1134 50,800 6  
DFU - 010 5 0927 - 1134 50,800 15  
DFU - 011 6 0927 - 1727 192,000 5  
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Appendix G. Test Kit Sheet Sample Results for B. anthracis 
 




1 0 1 
2 0 3 
3 0 4 
4 0 3 
5 0 3 
6 0 3 
7 0 4 
8 0 2 
9 1 # 
10 0 5 
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